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In recent metaethics, moral realists have advanced a companions-in-guilt argument 
against moral nihilism. Proponents of this argument hold that the conclusion that there are no 
categorical normative reasons implies that there are no epistemic reasons. However, if there are 
no epistemic reasons, there are no epistemic reasons to believe nihilism. Therefore, nihilism is 
false or no one has epistemic reasons to believe it. While this argument is normally presented as 
a reply to Mackie, who introduced the term “companions-in-guilt” in his Ethics: Inventing Right 
and Wrong of 1977, Herbert J. Phillips presented a form of this argument in this journal in 1940.2 
In this paper, I will discuss Phillips’ version of the companions-in-guilt argument, demonstrate 
how recent epistemology bears out an important premise of the argument, and compare Phillips’ 
argument to Derek Parfit’s recent work. 
For Phillips, nihilism is the view that “all judgments of the form ‘x ought to do y’ are 
false for all values of x and y” (42). This means that “all judgments of the form ‘x ought to 
believe p’ are false for all values of x and p” (42). Nihilism is thus committed to the conclusion 
that we have no reason to believe that nihilism is true. To resist this conclusion, Mackie qualifies 
his position, noting that his error theory is limited to categorical imperatives: reasons for acting 
that are “unconditional in the sense of not being contingent upon any present desire of the agent 
to whose satisfaction the recommended action would contribute as a means.”3 
Phillips, anticipating Mackie’s later qualification, thus argues that epistemic reasons are 
categorical, not instrumental. He presents the case of an individual whose sole end is to eat. 
Suppose that extensive thinking is required before this individual can eat. This requirement 
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makes thinking purely instrumental to the achievement of a desire. Why does this individual 
engage in such thinking? It cannot be because he understands that such thinking is a necessary 
condition of eating, for understanding is not itself a desire and cannot motivate us to act. It 
cannot be that he desires to do everything that is required in order to eat, for this would far 
exceed the capacities of normal humans. 
To establish the latter claim, Phillips imagines the case of a nonmasochistic person who 
chooses to see the dentist. This person does not have a drive to see the dentist, for the term 
“drive” is usually restricted to our ultimate ends. Instead, he is moved by a “tropism” (47). The 
tropism is not simply a desire, for the individual does not want to see the dentist; he is not a 
masochist. Phillips also finds it unsatisfactory to say that “it is because he wants to experience 
the feeling of physical well-being and sees that going to the dentist is a necessary condition to 
having such an experience” (47). Because the individual lacks a desire to see the dentist and 
cannot be motivated by the descriptive fact that dental work is a necessary condition for health, 
the individual must be motivated by a categorical normative fact. The individual who chooses to 
think in order to eat is also motivated by a categorical normative fact. Therefore, even when we 
use theoretical reasoning in service of our desires, we must appeal to categorical normative 
considerations. 
Some of Phillips’ argumentation may seem suspect; treating thinking as an act required in 
order to eat makes theoretical reasoning appear to be an action like any other, though 
philosophers have often recognized a distinction between belief and action.4 Recent 
epistemology can give us better arguments for the distinction between epistemic and 
instrumental rationality and thus lend support to Phillips’ view. Thomas Kelly, for example, has 
argued that we often lack cognitive goals that would give us what we typically take to be 
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epistemic reasons. He points out the case of a person who has not yet seen a popular movie and 
wants to avoid learning how the movie ends. Such a person has the cognitive goal of having no 
beliefs about the movie’s ending and thus has an instrumental reason not to believe what his 
evidence suggests. If given reliable evidence that the movie ends in a particular way, this person 
acquires an epistemic reason that conflicts with this instrumental reason. Therefore, epistemic 
reasons cannot simply be instrumental reasons.5 Kelly’s argument confirms Phillips’ view. 
For the companions-in-guilt argument to succeed, it must also be shown that theoretical 
reasoning is a normative process. That is, it must be shown that one must recognize a reason to 
believe that p if she is to be convinced that p. To show this, Phillips asks us to imagine an 
argument with someone about whom all “ought” claims are false. Phillips contends that such a 
person would be persuaded more by the tone of voice of a speaker than by the soundness of the 
speaker’s argument (43). This person will treat truth and implication merely as parts of a 
linguistic tradition, not as notions related to what she ought to believe; ex hypothesi, there is 
nothing that she ought to believe. Though she can fully understand our notions of truth and 
implication, we should find it unsurprising if she failed to believe the conclusions of sound 
arguments. To recognize the relevance of truth and implication to belief, there must be facts 
about what we ought to believe. 
Phillips thus anticipates an element of Parfit’s recent work. Arguing against analytical 
naturalism, Parfit notes that “the alethic concept implies the truth of is quite different from the 
normative concept gives us a decisive reason to believe” (emphasis original).6 However, Parfit 
maintains that “if we know that some argument is valid, and has true premises, these facts give 
us a decisive reason to accept this argument’s conclusion.”7 Parfit and Phillips agree that we can 
use the terms “true” and “implies” without invoking normative concepts, but processes of 
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theoretical reasoning and persuasion require that there be normative reasons. In this way, 
Phillips’ paper is an important and underappreciated precursor to contemporary metaethics. 
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